A High Price for Slightly Less Iraqi Chaos… or a Way Out: Richard A. Clarke | Good Harbor Report
A High Price for Slightly Less Iraqi Chaos… or a Way Out: Richard A. Clarke
Just as Rumsfeld refused to allow the military to call the fighting in Iraq an “insurgency,” so the White House is rejecting the use of “civil war” to describe the Shia-Sunni slaughter that has been taking fifty dead a day. Administration officials also argue that “premature” U.S. withdrawal will result in a civil war. The implication is that we need to keep U.S. combats units in Iraq to prevent a higher level of chaos. Our staying with U.S. combat troops for a few more years, they argue, will allow the Iraqis to improve their security forces and that, in turn, means the chaos will be less when we leave (whenever that is) than it would be if we left next year.
Put aside that some of the Iraqis we are training are the very same Iraqi security forces that appeared to be behind much of the kidnapping, torture, and killing, what the “stay the course” agreement comes down to is this:
– there is a high level of “sectarian strife” now
– if we withdraw U.S. combat forces in 2007 the “strife” will escalate further
– but if we stay on to, say 2009, the chaos ensuing upon the departure of U.S. combat units will be less than it would have been in 2007
– and that difference in levels of chaos post-U.S. combat unit withdrawal is worth the cost.
That difference in levels of chaos is hard to quantify. It may even be nonexistent, but we can estimate the cost of staying the additional two years:
– approximately 1000 more U.S. dead
– approximately 5000 more U.S, casualties, many involving loss of limbs or eyes
– approximately $150,000,000.0000.00 in US expenditure
– a continued stimulus for recruitment of terrorists as outlined in the recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate.
Is that possible difference in chaos post-U.S. combat unit withdrawal in 2009 rather than next year worth that price?
What if, instead of “staying the course” and incurring those costs, we focused on our national interests: defeating al Qaeda and related terrorist groups, containing Iranian threats, strengthening global support for America, and reinvigorating our battered Army and Marines? How do we do that? I suggest the following seven-point plan as a starting place for discussion:
–declare immediately that the US seeks no permanent military bases in Iraq, thereby quelling fears of moderate Iraqis who see the construction on-going of four mega-bases in the country and believe the insurgents ma be right about our intentions;
–announce our intention to continue to turn over more responsibility to the Iraqi Army on a schedule that will reduce US forces in Iraq from 140,000 beginning in December and concluding with the withdrawal of all major ground combat units approximately 18 months later;
–gain agreement from Kuwait to the stationing of US combat units there for the next five years, extending the basing agreement reached in 1991, for the purposes of stabilizing the region including quick reaction intervention in Iraq if required to protect Americans or to attack terrorists. This would create an “over the horizon” capability to deal with Iraq after the US combat units are redeployed;
–accelerate training for the Iraqi security forces and specify that we will continue that training indefinitely;
–working with regional allies, create an enhanced covert action and para-military capability run by CIA to deal with terrorists in Iraq;
–speed up delivery of reconstruction assistance and target delivery of services and job creation, declaring a ten-year commitment to continue the rebuilding process;
–convene a regional process to guarantee the stability of Iraq and invite Iran, Syria, Jordan, Turkey and the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC) countries.
Implementing such a plan would not give Iraq over to al Qaeda, but it would reduce the US hemorrhaging there. With that done, we could begin to readdress winning the strategic Battle of Ideas against Islamic terrorist groups. As long as we are fighting in Iraq, we cannot effectively engage in the Battle of Ideas, which the 9-11 Commission said is the only way of ultimately drying up support for al Qaeda.
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